The countries of East Asia and the American government were recently placed on alert after indications that North Korea was planning its first nuclear test following its missile test in July of this year.

Even if the grounds for this information are only vague, Kim Jong-Il, the Communist dictator, known as the "Dear Leader", continues his brinkmanship regarding North Korean policy towards the United States and international community. On several occasions (for example January 2003), North Korea has challenged the West and particularly America by withdrawing from the Non-Proliferation Treaty and declaring (February 2005) military nuclear capability, which American intelligence believes comprises at least one or two bombs.

At the same time, North Korea steadily pursues an intensive drive to export missile technologies, arms, drugs (mainly heroin), and forged bank notes (mostly US dollars). To the outside observer, the policy of capital Pyongyang seems surprising and even illogical - why does this isolated country persist in its defiant policy towards the world; and why should Israel pay attention to this far-off country?

Missile Export a Major Industry

A closer look at this isolated land offers fairly straightforward answers to these questions. Since the 1980s, North Korea has regarded the export of missiles an important source of foreign currency and Middle Eastern countries its key customers. 23 million North Koreans have suffered from starvation for the past decade following extended international political and economic sanctions (with stress on oil supply), for among other reasons acute and blatant human rights violations (torture, death camps, and Soviet gulag-style prisons), ecological issues, and a failing energy policy. An horrific humanitarian disaster is prevented each year thanks only to massive aid from UN agencies and NGOs, and this aid too is presently under threat following the government's threat to drastically curtail the activities of these organizations. In a desperate search for sources of income, and as communist ideals and economic sanctions stifle any economic development, North Korea opts to export its most desirable resource - missile technology.

Since the mid-1980s, the North Koreans have managed to develop versions of the Scud ground-to-ground missile family, which includes the manufacture of the Nodong long-range ballistic missile and the Taepodong-2, which was tested in July this year and according to Western assessments, is intercontinental. The Middle East, as noted, represents a thriving missile market. Among the customers for North Korean missiles, spare parts, and related technology, are Syria, Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen.

Iran's development program for long-range missiles capable of striking Israel with a nuclear warhead (the Shahab-3 and BM-25 with a range of over 3,000 kilometers, which North Korea began supplying to Iran in the last two years) would not have progressed without large-scale acquisitions from Pyongyang coupled with scientific assistance from the former Soviet Union.

In addition, there is a real fear that the North Koreans will decide to sell nuclear technology and related materials to countries in the region (perhaps even to terror organizations). This would be on the same basis as their missile transactions - the sale of entire systems and production lines to allow "customers" to achieve independent capability. In view of recent tensions with the United States, the North Korean regime has threatened on several occasions that unless America changes her "belligerent" policy towards North Korea, the latter will start disseminating its nuclear expertise, including the transfer of fissionable material and a nuclear reactor installation.

Incidentally, the United States has led several recent "offensive" initiatives with broad international support to block the continued spread of weapons from North Korea, for example, the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), involving extensive monitoring of trade routes (chiefly maritime), close intelligence cooperation, and maneuvers to intercept arms deliveries. The jury is still out on reached by these measures, although there have been successes (chiefly, the interception of a ship bound for Libya at the end of 2003, carrying centrifuge parts for uranium enrichment).

Stalling Tactics As Opposed To Action

Outwardly, all parties - including North Korea - agree on how to resolve the crisis -by dismantling the nuclear and missile programs in exchange for economic aid and the country's involvement in the international system, including normalization of relations with the US. Large-scale economic aid for North Korea and the development of additional markets (with emphasis for example on agriculture), would also help to save its population from chronic starvation, reducing its motivation to sell lethal equipment and expertise.

The problem is that the international community with the United States as its spearhead chooses to adopt stalling tactics against the Pyongyang regime: a spurt of negotiations (the Six-Party Talks); offers by the US and North Korea's Asian neighbors "the circle" (Japan, South Korea, China, and Russia); limited, staggered aid in exchange for equivalent measures by North Korea to dismantle practically her only strategic asset - the nuclear sphere. Underlying the goal is a hope that the economic siege and political stranglehold will accelerate the speedy demise of Kim Jong-Il's despotic regime. There is also profound suspicion and mistrust between America and North Korea: Washington is convinced that North Korea has acted fraudulently and developed another secret nuclear program in violation of treaties and past commitments; for its part North Korea worries that the Bush administration is plotting its downfall as a member of the "axis of evil", similar to Sadam Hussein.

The Israeli Point

On an exclusively Israeli note - few people know that in the early 1990s, advanced negotiations were held between Jerusalem and Pyongyang according to which Israel would provide economic aid and advice on gold mines, in a deal worth one billion dollars. In exchange, North Korean promised to stop supplying missiles to the Middle East. However, from the outset, the chances of finalizing this agreement were slim since Washington vetoed the plan (among other reasons due to North Korea's first withdrawal from the NPT in 1993), looking askance at Israeli activity in East Asia. Japan and South Korea also protested Israel's interference without consulting them. Even if other problems had arisen (disagreement within Israel), and it is unclear that North Korea would have honored the agreement, there still might have been time to change things.

One obvious conclusion learned from the case of North Korea concerns Israel's limited power to deal with a menace from far off countries whose actions have a deleterious effect on Israel's position regarding the strategic balance of powers in the Middle East. Thus, should North Korea decide to transfer nuclear weapons to Iran in return for billions of dollars (and as noted, it has already publicly declared its willingness to do so and is desperately screaming for money), Israel could find herself another nasty surprise: the almost overnight transformation of Iran into a nuclear power rendering all efforts to stem her nuclear armament useless.

However, while obstacles exist that prevent North Korea from taking this step (American deterrence, the danger of international sanctions against it chiefly by its ally China), this is no mere theoretical scenario. Thanks to past North Korean assistance, Iran can now fire missiles at Israel. Furthermore, a large portion of Iran's nuclear program is also based on foreign assistance: from Pakistani agencies (the smuggling network of nuclear scientist Abd Al-Kader Khan). Israel was been unable to prevent these threats and only became aware of some of them at a later stage.

The North Korean case also shows the need for an elaborate policy of checks and balances to deal with despotic states that use the supply of arms as "poor man's gold".

We also have the weapon of political international isolation backed by massive military threats - to the extent of being prepared to implement them from time to time to spell out the cost of breaking the rules by providing arms to irresponsible powers. This can be combined with extensive economic assistance to promote intensive domestic development thus strengthening the population and obviating the need to trade in death.

For the moment though, Israel lacks the power to influence Washington in any meaningful way in this regard, however, constantly repeating the message may put us on the road to the longed desired change.

About the Author

Analyst and researcher of World Security and International Relations for "Omedia" Specializes in Arms control of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Israel's status in the diplomatic arena. Holds a Bachelor's degree in Middle Eastern studies and a Master's diploma in American History.